The bounded rationality literature has studied heterogeneous learning rules under models with a single equilibrium. This paper examines learning with heterogeneous expectations in a simple macroeconomic model with multiple equilibria. Stability properties of this model are determined by the distribution of heterogeneity. These results differ greatly from those which impose homogenous expectations a priori. When the level of heterogeneity is allowed to vary, stability conditions become more restrictive due to the stationarity requirements of the simpler, more parsimonious updating rule. Finally, I find that the two equilibria exchange stability when the MSE of using this simpler updating rule is minimized.
Introduction
Expectations have been an important part of many macroeconomic models. Consumers and firms maximize their expected utility, or profit, based upon their expectations of several economic variables Since they effect the decision process, expectations will naturally also have a large impact on the macroeconomy. The current accepted method for modelling expectations in macroeconomics is allowing agents to form Rational Expectations (RE). With RE, agents form their expectations using the mathematical expectations operator conditioned upon available information usually involving perfect knowledge of the market equilibrium. Although RE is the solution norm for the profession, many economists believe that RE gives agents too much intelligence by assuming that they know all the equilibrium parameter values of the model.
Since the introduction of RE by Muth (1961) and Lucas (1972 Lucas ( , 1973 , the bounded rationality literature has presented several alternatives. The works of Townsend (1978) , Bray and Savin (1986), , Guesnerie (1992) , and Hommes and Sorger (1998) have suggested several types of less sophisticated expectations schemes to limit the intelligence of economic agents.
One method to limit hyperrationality is by allowing agents to learn the parameters of the model through time. With econometric learning, agents are boundedly rational with the ability to learn the parameters of the model by using least squares to form their expectations. The agents attempt to estimate the REE by using data from the economy. They form statistical estimates of the equilibrium parameters and update these estimates every period. It has been discovered that the learning process is stable and converges to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) for some macroeconomic models with reasonable parameter values. Evans (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1992) introduced the E-stability principle which states that the mapping from the perceived law of motion (PLM) to the actual law of motion (ALM) governs the stability of the REE under least squares learning. 1 Using their E-stability principle, for some macroeconomic models, we can determine the stability of the solution under this learning rule. One may think that if these solutions are E-stable, then using RE may not be such an undesirable method to solve for long run equilibria. Furthermore, for models with multiple equilibria, we can distinguish between solutions that are E-stable and those that are not E-stable.
In the learning literature, a few papers consider models with heterogenous expectations. Evans and Honkapohja (1997) focus on a situation where all agents use the same learning process, but they all may begin with different initial expectations. They find that all of the agents will asymptotically learn the RE solution analogous to the RE in the homogeneous expectations case as long as it is E-stable. Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001) allow for heterogeneity and random adjustments in expectations in a model with a continuum [0,1] agents. They suppose that each agent may have one of two types of expectations given some probability. They find that the heterogeneity disappears asymptotically and the expectations then converge to the RE solution. Under this form of heterogeneity, the stability conditions may not be the same in some models for homogenous and heterogenous expectations. Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) present structural heterogeneity where the representative agent can not be used. They find that this type of heterogeneous learning affects stability conditions for learning for some common macroeconomic models. Giannitsarou (2003) considers three types of heterogeneity: initial perceptions, different degrees of inertia in updating, and different learning rules. She shows that the last two types of heterogeneity may cause different stability conditions than with homogeneous expectations.
The above literature has focused mainly on heterogeneity in models with a single equilibrium. Multiple equilibria has been well discussed in the macroeconomic literature by Azariadis (1981) , Cass and Shell (1983) , Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) , and Farmer (1999) .
When heterogeneous expectations exist in a model with multiple equilibria, one can examine how heterogeneity affects the stability properties of more than one equilibrium under learning.
Furthermore, if the level of heterogeneity is allowed to change, the stability properties of the equilibria can be further examined. This paper presents heterogeneity in a different manner than the papers listed above. This is a fourth type of heterogeneity that can exist in a model with multiple equilibria. I assume that there are two types of agents with different perceived laws of motion. The first type believes that some economic variable follows an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process while the second type believes that this variable follows an AR(1) process. Both types of agents use least squares to learn the true process of the economic variable in question. This paper examines how this form of heterogeneity affects E-stability in a specific "ad hoc" macroeconomic model. I show that the E-stability conditions will be affected by the proportion of agents that use each perceived law of motion. Finally, I examine the relationship between E-stability and the mean square error (MSE) of each equilibrium. It turns out that the two equilibria "exchange" stability at a level of heterogeneity where the MSE of the inefficient predictor is minimized.
The Model

Homogeneous Expectations
The model used in this paper is a linear stochastic macroeconomic model. and it has previously been the focus of detailed analysis in the learning literature, for example see Evans and Honkapohja (1994) and Heinemann (2000) .
The reduced form of these models is the following:
where E * denotes a not necessarily rational expectation and v t is a linear combination of iid stochastic shocks. Therefore, E t−1 v t = 0.
REE Solutions
I first present the solutions to the model under homogeneous expectations, so that the impact to the solutions from heterogeneity can be fully understood. Each agent will use their perceived law of motion (PLM) of the economy to estimate the parameters of the model. The solution to the model will depend upon the distribution of the agents with different PLM's, so the solution to equation 1 will depend on the averaged perceived law of motion among all agents. The averaged PLM produces the actual law of motion (ALM) followed by the economy. If all agents use the following perceived law of motion (defined as P LM 1 or the "first predictor"):
then the unique (REE) is the following:
If all agents use the following PLM (defined as P LM 2 or the "second predictor"):
then there are two REE of the following:
These solutions are referred to as the AR (1) solution and the minimum state variable (MSV) solution respectively. As one can see, the MSV solution to the model using P LM 2 has the same value as the solution to the model using P LM 1 .
E-stability Conditions
In order for agents to learn an equilibrium value for the parameters of the model, the equilibrium must be E-stable. 
where T is the mapping from the perceived law of motion, φ, to the implied actual law of motion, T (φ) and τ denotes "notional" or "artificial" time.
Formal details of the T-map, T , are provided below. If an equilibrium is E-stable, then the agents will asymptotically learn the given equilibrium. This is a local condition, so initial parameter estimates must be in the neighborhood of attraction to ensure E-stability. 3 When all agents use the same PLM, the equilibrium constitutes a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE). 2 In the homogenous expectations case, φ = (a 1 ) for P LM 1 and φ =
It turns out that the REE's are E-stable for only some values of β 0 and β 1 . These E-stability conditions are expressed graphically in figure 1 which will be useful to compare these conditions with the E-stability conditions for heterogeneous expectations.
FIGURE 1. E-stability Conditions for Homogenous Expectations
If agents use P LM 1 , it turns out that the condition for E-stability is
This is known as the weak E-stability condition for the MSV solution. One can also find the strong E-stability conditions for the MSV solution which are the E-stability conditions for the MSV solution where all agents use P LM 2 . The strong E-stability conditions are
The E-stability conditions for the AR(1) solution for P LM 2 are
It is not possible for the MSV solution to be strongly E-stable and the AR(1) solution to be weakly E-stable which will be an important fact in the case of heterogenous expectations.
The Model with Heterogenous Expectations
For heterogeneous expectations, assume that there are two types of agents. One type uses the MSV PLM, or P LM 1 , while the other uses the AR(1) PLM, or P LM 2 . These agents may differ because the first type of agents are not willing to calculate the values for both a and b, so they decide to just find the average of y. Assume that there is a fixed proportion of agents who use P LM 1 and agents who use P LM 2 . This assumption will later be relaxed in the paper. Let µ be referred to as the proportion of agents that use the MSV PLM. Therefore, a proportion of µ agents form expectations using P LM 1 :
and a proportion of (1 − µ) agents form expectations using P LM 2 :
The actual law of motion (ALM) is formed from the averaged PLM of the agents, or P LM A :
The ALM By combining equations 1 and 13, I obtain:
This equation describes the actual stochastic process followed by y t given the PLM's of the two types of agents. For each type, I now compute, for this y t process, the actual PLM parameters that best fit the y t process (in the mean square sense). I will call these implied parameters the ALM. For type 2 agents, the ALM parameters are simply the intercept and slope parameters of the implied y t process. Because, for µ < 1, agents using P LM 1 underparameterize the y t stochastic process, I need to compute for them the parameters of the y t process projected onto the space of P LM 1 . Since type 1 agents model the process as iid, this is simply given by the mean of the implied y t process. 7 The mapping from the average PLM to the ALM is thus the following: 4
where T a1 5 is a "projected ALM" 6 assuming that the model follows a stationary process
Note that the first component of the T-map is given by:
The Mixed Expectations Equilibria
Next, I solve for the Mixed Expectations Equilibrium (MEE), where are defined as the fixed points of the T-mapping. 7 The agents that use P LM 2 have the correct form of the economy and therefore their solution is rational within the equilibrium. Those agents using P LM 1 underparameterize the economy; although their mean is correct, their forecast errors are correlated with y t−1 and hence their expectations are not as precise as the agents using P LM 2 . The learned solution for the agents using P LM 1 is optimal given their restricted class of PLM's. It is easily verified from the T-map that the MEE are:
, and (17)
For convenience, I call this the ALM, although for type 1 agents the T-map gives the projected ALM.
5 T a1 denotes the first component of the map.
or
, and
where:
As with homogenous expectations where all agents use P LM 2 , there are two equilibria: the AR (1) solution 17 and the MSV solution 18. It is important to note that the MSV MEE is the same as the MSV REE under homogeneous expectations. The AR(1) MEE is a combination of the MSV REE and the AR(1) REE since both PLM's are being used. 8
E-Stability
Next, I solve for the E-stability conditions 9 which is done by forming an ordinary differential equation (ODE) of the following:
For stability, the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of this above expression must have negative real parts. 10 Figure 2 graphically presents all the E-stability results found below.
E-stability Results for the MSV MEE and AR(1) MEE
The E-stability results of the MSV MEE and the AR(1) MEE are stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: E-stability conditions for the above linear stochastic model with heterogeneous expectations.
All MSV MEE in the set
are E-stable. All MSV MEE outside of this set are E-unstable.
All AR(1) MEE in the set
are E-stable. All AR(1) MEE outside of this set are E-unstable. 11 
Graphical Representation of the E-stability Conditions
The original homogenous MSV strong E-stability condition was represented by area A in figure 2. Heterogenous expectations now adds area B to A as the area of MSV E-stability. Area B represents an area that was weakly MSV E-stable but not strongly MSV E-stable for homogenous expectations. This area now represents part of the MSV E-stable area since some of the agents use the MSV PLM. The E-stability conditions for the MSV MEE are now dependent upon µ, the proportion of agents using the MSV predictor.
11 In this paper, I do not examine stability properties when some agents use higher order PLM's.
FIGURE 2. E-stability Conditions for Heterogeneous Expectations
These E-stability conditions reflect a combination of the strong E-stability and weak E-stability conditions from the MSV REE with homogenous expectations. The restriction on β 0 decreases as the proportion of agents using P LM 1 increases. Since both the weak and strong E-stability results for homogeneous expectations have the inequality β 0 + β 1 < 1 in common, intuition tells us that µ should not be included in this stability condition. These results produce the following corollary: Less stringent means that as µ increases, the maximum value for β 0 necessary for MSV E-stability increases. Note that as β 0 is allowed to increase, the model requires a smaller value of β 1 for MSV E-stability. This is due to the condition: β 0 + β 1 < 1 necessary for MSV E-stability.
Now consider the AR(1) E-stability conditions represented by regions C and D in figure 2 .
Region D represents an area that was non-stationary with homogenous expectations, but it is now stationary and E-stable for a given µ. E-stability conditions rule out area E which was AR (1) E-stable and stationary with homogenous expectations. Area E now represents the MEE that are non-stationary that would be stationary if all agents used the AR(1) PLM.
The E-stability conditions for the AR(1) MEE are a hybrid of both the E-stability conditions for the MSV REE and the AR(1) REE under homogeneous expectations. The stability condition
is a form of the E-stability condition for the AR(1) solution in the homogenous case where β 0 > 1.
The stability condition
is a combination of the two conditions for AR(1) E-stability
the strong E-stability conditions for the MSV solution
all divided by the condition for stationarity
With these two stability conditions for the model, I will examine how the agents who misspecify the model affect the stability of the equilibrium. In other words, what happens to the stability of the equilibria when the value of µ increases? As more agents use P LM 1 , the E-stable MEE will eventually not be the solution corresponding to the "minority" of agents using P LM 2 .
The Role of Heterogeneity
Corollary 2 shows that if the level of heterogeneity, µ , is arbitrarily changed, then a MEE may transform from being E-stable to E-unstable. I now consider in detail the implications of varying µ. For this exercise to be well defined, I need to require that every AR(1) MEE be stochastically stationary. This is because If the MEE is non-stationary, then the agents using P LM 1 will be using an obviously misspecified learning rule. I will therefore only consider models in which all AR(1) solutions are stationary for all µ ∈ [0, 1 −
). 12 In the appendix, it is shown that for b 2 < 1, it must be that
Stationarity for Heterogenous Expectations
Assume that the values of β 0 and β 1 always satisfy the above condition. This rules out the shaded areas represented in figure 4 . A restriction for β 0 and β 1 will not be necessary for −1 < b 2 since the AR(1) MEE is not E-stable for
No additional assumption for the MSV MEE is necessary because there is no problem of stationarity for this solution.
FIGURE 4. E-stability Conditions for Heterogeneous Expectations When µ is Allowed to Vary
Switching
For parameters restricted to this region, at least one of the two MEE's is E-stable for all µ ∈ [0, 1].
However, for part of the region, the equilibria exchange E-stability when the proportion of agents using the MSV predictor, µ, is changed. Recall
0 is the point where the solution changes from being MSV E-stable to AR(1) E-stable. As the value of µ increases, the level curve, β 0 = 1 1−µ , shifts to the right. With a large enough increase in µ, the model will transform from being AR(1) E-stable to being MSV E-stable. The following proposition examines the limits of this level curve to establish the region of E-stability switching.
Proposition 2: Switching occurs within the set
This region described above is the same region of weak E-stability of the AR(1) REE and the MSV REE in the homogenous expectations case with the restricted stationarity conditions. This area is represented as areas B and C in figure 4 . Adding more agents that use a particular PLM to the model makes the solution corresponding to that particular PLM more likely to be E-stable.
The Mean Squared Error and Switching
Next, consider the mean squared error (MSE) for each estimator under each equilibrium. The MSE is calculated in the appendix and is the following for the AR(1) MEE:
where the subscript denotes the number of the PLM used as a predictor. The MSE for P LM 1 is never less than the MSE for P LM 2 , for the AR(1) MEE, since P LM 1 is the inefficient estimator of the solution. The MSE for the MSV MEE is the following:
In this case, each predictor has the same asymptotic quality of prediction. This brings forward the question "why does E-stability switch from the AR (1) It turns out that the minimum of MSE 1 is σ 2 . The two equilibria, at this value of µ, are equal to the MSV MEE where b 2 = 0. Therefore, this is the point where both predictors are efficient,
When the MSE's of the solutions are equal, there is an exchange of stability between the two solutions. As more agents use a specific predictor, the solution that is E-stable is the solution corresponding to that predictor. When µ is larger than its switching point value, the MSV predictor is no longer asymptotically inefficient, since the AR(1) solution changes from a sink to a source. Hence, here the MSV solution is E-stable while the AR (1) solution is not. When µ is smaller than the above value, the inefficiency of the MSV predictor and the fact that more of the agents are using P LM 2 makes the AR(1) solution E-stable and the MSV solution E-unstable.
Agent Dynamic E-stability
Finally, I examine the region where switching never occurs, but one MEE is always E-stable for all µ ∈ [0, 1]. This will be referred to as Agent Dynamic E-stability.
Definition 3: A MEE is Agent Dynamic E-stable (ADE) if it is E-stable for all
When a MEE is Agent Dynamic E-stable, no change in agents beliefs can change the stability of either MEE. E-stability of this solution does not depend upon the proportion of agents using P LM 1 , so switching will never occur. The region of ADE turns out to be the same region as another important area in the homogenous agent problem.
Proposition 3: The region of ADE in the heterogenous agent case is equal to the region of strong E-stability for the MSV solution in the homogenous agents case.
The region of ADE is represented by area A in figure 4 . The above proposition gives information on the nature of E-stability of the MEE's in the ADE region. The reason the AR (1) MEE is never E-stable here is that for homogenous expectations, it is not E-stable here. This intuition produces the following corollary:
Corollary 4: For the model presented above, the only MEE that is ADE is the MSV solution.
Conclusion
This paper has studied several asymptotic convergence properties of the above model under heterogenous expectations. The E-stability conditions were observed for the model for both the AR(1) and Minimum State Variable (MSV) solutions. I then observed the stability conditions of the model under learning when heterogeneity was allowed to vary. For this, I examined both the mean squared error for using each predictor and also the restrictions for the AR(1) solution to always be stationary for all E-stable solutions.
The AR (1) solution is affected by heterogeneous expectations, but the MSV solution does not change with heterogeneous expectations. E-stability of the mixed expectations equilibrium (MEE) for both the MSV and AR (1) solutions depends upon the proportion of agents who believe that the economy follows an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) process. If this proportion of heterogeneity were different, some solutions that are E-stable for the current proportion of heterogeneity become E-unstable solutions.
Finally, I ask "what are the stability conditions if we can observe any level of heterogeneity?"
It turns out that for the agents using the i.i.d. predictor to learn a solution, the equilibrium must be stationary for any level of heterogeneity. I find the conditions for stationarity for all previously E-stable equilibria. From this set of possible equilibria, two phenomena may occur. First, for an exogenously changing level of heterogeneity, it is possible that one initially E-stable equilibrium may become E-unstable while the other equilibrium becomes E-stable at this point of change.
There is an exchange of stability between the two equilibria at the level of heterogeneity where the mean squared error of the MSV predictor is minimized. Second, in another region of the parameter space, the MSV equilibrium may be E-stable for all possible levels of heterogeneity.
Heterogeneity adds another kink to the armor of the rational expectations hypothesis. For agents to possess RE, they must know the structure of the equilibrium as well as the expectations made by all other agents in the economy. Because of this additional strong assumption, the bounded rationality literature becomes even more attractive as an alternative paradigm for modelling expectations.
Appendix
Proofs Proof of Proposition 1 An equilibrium is E-stable if the E-stability differential equation
is stable. This means the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of this ODE must all have negative real parts.
1. When we insert the value of b 2 = 0 into the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, we get the following eigenvalues: 13 −1,
All three of these values are negative when:
When any of these conditions are not met, at least one of the eigenvalues has positive real parts making the ODE unstable. Therefore, for the MSV MEE to be E-stable, the parameters must be contained in the above mentioned set.
When we insert the value of
into the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, we get the following eigenvalues: 14
It can be easily shown that for µ = 1, the eigenvalues are {−1, −1, −1 + β 0 + β 1 }. This turns out to be the MSV weak E-stability condition for the homogenous agents case. 14 For µ = 0, it turns out the eigenvalues are: {−1, −1 + β 0 + (1 + b 2 )β 1 , β 0 + 2β 1 b 2 − 1}. This is the result for AR(1) weak E-stability in the homogenous agents case.
All three of these values are negative when:
Consider inequality 33 for E-stability. We can re-write this equation as
Let us consider the case where β 1 < 0. Since there are some agents that use P LM 1 , the model must be stationary. Therefore,
This can be further written as
Therefore, for inequality 33 to hold, it must be that
The stationarity condition is more restrictive than this, so it turns out that the stationarity condition:
will be one of the conditions for E-stability in this model. Now consider the case where β 1 > 0. For stationarity, it turns out that we need:
This means that it must be that
Our first E-stability condition
will not be met in this case. Therefore, for the AR(1) MEE to be E-stable, the following must hold: 
Choose
Now the model is no longer AR(1) E-stable.
Proof of Proposition 2
For switching to occur we must be in a region where both types of E-stability exist for some µ ∈ [0, 1]. For the AR(1) MEE to be potentially E-stable for all µ ∈ [0, 1), it must be that the solution will be stationary for all µ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, it must be that β 1 < − 
Proof of Proposition 3
In the homogenous expectations case, both the AR (1) 
The second solution is exactly the switching point of E-stability of the above model as long as
. Checking the SOC, we find that
is a maximum for the MSE 1 , while
is a minimum for the MSE 1 . 
Proof of Proposition 3 From the homogenous agent case, the region of strong E-stability in the above model is
A = {(β 0 , β 1 )|β 0 < 1, β 0 + β 1 < 1}. In
The Stochastic Recursive Algorithm
To show that E-stability is applicable for this model, we must show that stability of the stochastic recursive algorithm can be determined by exactly the E-stability equation:
The model with the two learning rules presented above can be described using recursive least squares. The model in RLS form is:
where
Consider a stochastic recursive algorithm of the form
where θ t is a vector of parameter estimates, X t is the state vector, and γ t is a deterministic sequence of gains. Q describes the way in which the estimate θ t−1 is updated every period from the previous period's observations. The system 41-42 is implicitly in the standard form of the SRA 15 where:
We have now set up the T-mapping such that T 1 and T 2 correspond with the PLM's of the two types of agents respectively. Notice that the ALM for the economy is governed entirely by the T-mapping of the agents with the correctly specified model. 
where h (θ) is h (θ) = lim t→∞ EQ (t, θ, X t ) .
Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we get the following:
h φ (φ, S) = lim 
Since
E(y t ) = T 1 (φ t−1 ), and Ez t−1 v t = 0, we have the following:
The associated ODE from the system of SRA's becomes:
This system is now recursive and note that equation 53 is a globally stable system with S → M z (φ) from any starting point. From this fact, it follows that S −1 M z (φ) → I from any starting point provided that S is invertible along the path. This means that the stability of the system can be determined entirely by the following ODE:
Therefore, we can find the stability of the system by finding the E-stability conditions.
Stationarity of the AR(1) MEE
Here we solve for the maximum value for b 2 . Recall that
Therefore, From this we get:
Therefore,
The ODE and the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
From the T-mapping we can get the following ODE: To check for stability, we must find the Jacobian matrix of the previous ODE and look at the eigenvalues of that matrix. I find that the eigenvalues of this matrix are:
Eigenvalues of Jacobian= All these eigenvalues must have negative real parts. Note that the third eigenvalue has a restriction that the denominator can not be equal to zero.
Calculation of the MSE for both of the PLM's
MSE for the first PLM PLM1:
